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Virtue & Human Development

Gdańsk, 2–3 June 2022

Abstracts

Contents

PAGE | **2**

The University
of Gdańsk

Virtue & Human
Development
Gdańsk, 2–3 June 2022

The Institute
of Philosophy

PAGE | **3**

The University
of Gdańsk

Virtue & Human
Development
GDAŃSK, 2–3 JUNE 2022

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Capability measurement and human flourishing: An overview of some issues

The presentation discusses attempts to operationalize a Sen-Nussbaum alternative to utilitarian ethics within economics and development. It presents this program in context and will offer an outline of the ethical motivation and the original theory before moving on to consider a variety of applications. Some of the policy impacts around measurement are discussed as well as applications that focus on the development of capability measures and their application in a variety of settings. The presentation will also include some reflections on ways in which applications may shed light on conceptual questions within the approach as well as aspects of ethical paradigm dynamics.

The University
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Virtue & Human
Development
Gdańsk, 2–3 June 2022

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Actions and feelings in Aristotelian habituation

The discussion of the vices of excess and deficiency in Book III of the *Nicomachean Ethics* suggests that rather than having a uniform strategy for habituating oneself towards virtue, each vice requires an in-depth understanding of what has gone wrong, and a personalized strategy of moral improvement. The cultivation of virtue is a complex, diverse topic, which cannot be captured in one strategy.

For example, if one is cowardly the advice to perform more courageous acts works well. By exposing oneself to, appropriate, situations which require courage, one can train one's fear emotions to work more in harmony with reason. However, this doesn't work for rashness. Here, performing more acts exacerbates the vice; not only is one rash to begin with, but by exposing oneself to more situations where fear should be triggered but is not, one may be habituating one's inappropriate fearlessness further. The correct strategy is to both refrain from the rash act but also to do something else to address the problem of deficient fear. One would imagine that a purposeful engagement with the particulars of the situation, which makes the agent more aware of the number and nature of the risks involved, more connected to the harmful impact of the risks actualizing, etc., will be a better strategy in this case. What is needed here is not more action but something which provokes more fear.

At the same time, the vices associated with temperance seem to also require different strategies, but this time in the opposite

direction: fewer acts curtail licentiousness, while engaging with pleasures might stimulate the insensible person's interest in them. The discussion of the other vices in Book III reveals yet more diverse strategies for the cultivation of virtue and strengthens the case for a rich Aristotelian moral psychology.

Virtue & Human Development
Gdańsk, 2–3 June 2022

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Aesthetic virtue and its potential for aesthetics

Aesthetic virtue is not a popular notion in philosophical aesthetics, traditionally focused, on the one hand, on the notions related to art (such as work of art, artistic value) and, on the other hand, on notions such as aesthetic value or aesthetic experience. Over the recent decade, however, the idea of aesthetic virtue seems to generate more interest among aestheticians, since it appears to have potential for developing new approaches to old questions.

Most current theories of aesthetic virtue are related to issues discussed in relation to art, specifically practices of its creation and reception/appreciations, but the proposal to include the concept of virtues into aesthetics also offers some tools to enrich a relatively new research programme called everyday aesthetics.

In my presentation, I will briefly describe current approaches and how the notion of aesthetic virtue is defined and used in aesthetics focused on art - virtues of art making and art appreciation, as well as art interpreted as means to illustrate/exemplify virtues. I will then shed some light on how the concept of aesthetic virtue may be applied beyond art, such as the natural environment. Both domains deal with their own set of challenges, which I would discuss only briefly, since I am primarily interested in how introducing aesthetic virtue into everyday aesthetics (interested in aesthetic aspects of the world beyond art) may contribute to this approach.

Therefore, in the final part, I will proceed to introduce everyday aesthetics, especially the way it links aesthetic value to action and

PAGE | 7

The University
of Gdańsk

Virtue & Human
Development
Gdańsk, 2–3 June 2022

The Institute
of Philosophy

decision-making, as well as its programmatic intertwining or re-
-integration of values in actual everyday aesthetic experiences. In
this context, I would like to embed the idea of aesthetic virtue in
everyday aesthetics to propose - as a matter open for discussion
- the understanding of aesthetic virtue as a factor contributing to
choices based on aesthetic preferences. Aesthetic virtues would be
understood as those which are related to choices and preferences
of aesthetic nature but take into account other values, consequ-
ences, motivations.

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On the adequacy of action guidance in virtue ethics

A continuous objection to virtue ethics has been its alleged inadequacy in providing a distinctive account of right action and determinate action guidance. The virtue ethical criterion "An action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances," has been claimed by some to give wrong results in some cases, and thus doomed to failure. However, I argue that the opponents who raise these objections overlook an important distinction between "action assessment" and "action guidance" in virtue ethics. Once this distinction which is alien to other dominant moral theories is taken into consideration, virtue ethics can supply a distinctive theory of right action and sufficient action guidance. Moreover, I will demonstrate that by revealing this peculiarity, it becomes clear that virtue ethics has some structural advantages which enable it to provide multiple guidance strategies to different agents with differential cognitive and moral developmental levels. In this virtue ethics is a more realistic normative ethics than deontological and consequentialist theories that take a single principle and expect all types of agents to apply them correctly in a procedural way regardless of their moral developmental stages. Finally, I will argue that while theories which tell moral agents what to do by providing exact and narrow answers might affect moral agency in negative ways by frustrating development of an integrated moral character, virtue ethics seems to avoid this effect. By abstaining

from providing a decision procedure which tells agent what they "exactly" must do, VE contributes to development of an integrated moral character in a more complicated way in line with the complex nature of moral phenomena.

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The spectre of 'moral progress' and Nietzschean restitution of values

When an ideal is placed low as to be 'universally accessible', the ideal itself is degraded. Virtue commonly is defined in Western philosophy as a 'thing in itself', possessing unconditional significance. In the history of metaphysics dominated by the Middle Eastern doctrine, virtue's paradigm was built on reflection about truth, as Nietzsche pointed out. The boundaries of truth have evolved as human life has evolved in the World. In the light of the event of the death of God, virtues lost their supernatural origin. Along with the decomposition of faith – built on anti-life teleology – the idea of virtue formulated 'forever' collapsed. 'Moral progress' in the benefit of hindsight of transmutation of principles of what is valuable is a Machiavellian 'building on sand', sc. on man. Considerations of a homogeneous morality become aberrant when anthropocentric foundations of truth are identified. Virtue systems vary, moralities differ, existing differently, they cannot constitute a continuum. Nietzsche distinguishes between values: intended for the subtlest and contributes to their flourishing, and intended for the numerous, to sustain aurea mediocritas (eudaimonism). Value that would be attainable for everyone ruins the sense of creativity that constitutes the roots of Life. 'Moral progress' is possible when nobility disappears. 'Human development' is an illusion in the face of the identification of universality as anthropocentric ephemera. The ratio of creative to reproductive beings is constant and not

subject to fluctuations of the general population. Man 'developed' according to the objectives he set for himself, which is why he impoverished existence. In the face of the disintegration of truth, the essence is how to decide on values correlated 'with what is alive'. Nietzsche's die Umwertung aller Werte - the revalorization of all values - is a restitution of the Classical harmony of value-making, a life-giving reflection in the preservation of What Is.

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Sustainable development and smartphone as an ethical problem

Sustainable development are activities aimed at development that will also allow future generations to live well (prosperously). The goals of sustainable development include preventing growing inequalities, maintaining clean energy, decent work, a clean environment, responsible consumption and production, and peace.

In this context, one may ask whether a smartphone can be an ethical problem and affect the correct - including ethical human development? On the scale of other problems, the question seems to be insignificant, but it is not. This is a question about allowing the constant development of systems that force regular users to systematically replace functional smartphones with newer models and devote more and more time to their operation. Replacement is necessary because new systems do not run on older hardware and the user has to learn everything from scratch. Is the annual replacement of a smartphone during the climate crisis an ethical issue? In the world of constant development, what should independence of thinking involve and can you think independently and ethically with an old smartphone? Can a digital native not have a new model, or is he facing a social exclusion tailored to the digital world? Due to the planet's resources, replacing the smartphone every year or more frequently is an ethical problem and is closely connected with the ethical development of a human.

PAGE | **13**

The University
of Gdańsk

Virtue & Human
Development
Gdańsk, 2–3 June 2022

The Institute
of Philosophy

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Cultivation of virtues of anarchism

In my presentation, I will examine the virtues needed for flourishing anarchist social practices. Anarchism is a political, social, and philosophical movement and tradition which was one of the constitutive parts of the emerging socialist working-class movement in the 19th century, especially alongside Marxism. Liberty, prefiguration, anti-statism/anti-hierarchy, and social view of the self are the core concepts of anarchism.

Anarchist scholar Benjamin Franks, who has formulated the definition of anarchism along the lines above stated, has also made explicitly the connection between anarchism and the virtue ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre. Based on the work of Franks' investigation of the intersection of anarchism and virtue ethics, I inquire about the nature of anarchist virtues, both individual and societal, needed for creating and maintaining a society where anarchism's commitment to anti-hierarchical institutions and practices are valued and sustained in the daily functioning of the society.

Citations include Franks' "Anarchism and the Virtues" (2010) and *Anarchisms, Postanarchisms and Ethics* (2020). Other references discussing the virtues of anarchism and the challenges they face include Samuel Clark's "Kicking Against the Pricks: Anarchist Perfectionism and the Conditions of Independence" (2010) and Matthew S. Adams' "Utopian civic virtue: Bakunin, Kropotkin, and anarchism's republican inheritance" (2019).

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The virtue of forgiveness and the moral development of persons experiencing harm

This presentation is based on the assumption that moral development is conditioned by everyday decisions in which particular persons resolve dilemmas regarding doing good to other people or adopting an attitude of indifference to this good, or harming them. In many cases, these decisions are not made under neutral circumstances but after experiencing harm. In other words, victims decide about their moral development by referencing those who made them suffer. The direction of moral development is conditioned by the decision to either take revenge (whether in the form of indifference or retaliation) or forgive. In this context, forgiveness can be perceived as a condition for moral development, and an attitude toward forgiveness can be considered a virtue. However, the decision to forgive raises many questions, concerning, for example, victims' self-respect and the administration of justice. In this analysis, the thesis is put forward that possessing the virtue of forgiveness is a condition for moral development. This thesis draws on the neo-Thomistic theory of moral development, according to which moral development is understood as the development of moral virtues. Defining forgiveness is a key part of this analysis because only the answer to the question *What is forgiveness?* would make it possible to relate forgiveness to the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, moderation and fortitude.

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The role of mental images in character education: some educational strategies

> "Man is a creature who makes pictures of himself and then comes to resemble the picture. This is the process which moral philosophy must attempt to describe and analyse."
>
> Iris Murdoch, *Metaphysics and Ethics*.

The effectiveness of curated mental images has been demonstrated in positive psychology and narrative psychology interventions, especially in increasing addiction recovery, reducing reoffending, enhancing trauma healing (Brown and West, 2018; Cowden, 2021; Markus and Nurius, 1986; Weegmann, 2018). In philosophy the issue of the influence of mental images on broadly understood human morality has been dismissively deemed "largely an empirical question." Smuts (2016) argues that what we do (cherishing, enjoying, admiring) with mental images matters, not the content of the images as they are morally neutral. In this paper I argue that some mental images, such as future oriented self-representations in imagination, can have a positive (but also negative) influence on our sense of morality and moral practice. In this regard what matters is both the content of the images and how we approach them. I argue that curated future-oriented mental representations of selfhoods can play a positive role in character education. These images are meant to represent real possibilities for human subjects. I define the "real" as pertaining to the realm of actualizable

possibilities that can be designated as factual and/or actual. Real possibilities are not simply "pre-existing" possibilities that are merely formal. Thus, they are "practical possibilities" or "potentializabilities" which posit something as "possibly doable." Engagement of mental images in the framework of character education would require educators to motivate students to create mental images of their future selves and simultaneously (and subsequently) develop a set of virtues reflective of these mental images, or necessary to their actualization. Invested with plans, values, and desires, future-oriented mental representations of the self will a) motivate individuals to learn and b) practice virtues. Acting is important point of orientation for moral development these images c) will facilitate guided moral habituation and d) they will strengthen cross-situational consistency.

PAGE | 17

The University
of Gdańsk

Virtue & Human
Development
Gdańsk, 2–3 June 2022

The Institute
of Philosophy

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The importance of social virtues in human happiness: a problematic case of carrying out capital punishment. Aquinas on vengeance and charity.

For many centuries capital punishment has been accepted as a just and lawful form of restituting the equality of justice. Nonetheless, in recent decades many different objections have been formulated against it. In this study, I analyse a common objection according to which capital punishment is nothing else than uncivilized "vengeance".

While referring to the "Summa Theologiae" of St. Thomas Aquinas and the texts of other Thomistic authors, such as G. E. M. Anscombe and Edward Feser, I compare the contemporary opinions on this topic with the classical Thomistic approach.

The analysis consists of three parts. In the first part, I examine and present the aforementioned objection. I show that it ascribes to a judge or an executioner such motives as bloodlust or hatred and stipulates that he has no concern for the good of the criminal. Then I reconstruct the Thomistic approach to the question of vengeance (*vindicatio*) by showing that for Aquinas vengeance is a moral virtue annexed to justice.

In the second part, I show that capital punishment is not a hateful act of "vengeance" but a proper realization of a virtue *vindicatio*. I analyse the following necessary elements of administering and carrying out capital punishment: (i) guilt of a criminal, (ii) right intention, (iii) proper motive, (iv) proper goal, and (v) right object

PAGE | **18**

The University
of Gdańsk

Virtue & Human
Development
GDAŃSK, 2–3 JUNE 2022

The Institute
of Philosophy

of the punishment. In this aspect, I draw also from the analogy between amputation and capital punishment.

In the last part, I demonstrate that *vindicatio* is an important part of the moral character of any human being that allows the agent to properly react to any encountered injustices. Additionally, I show that carrying out capital punishment brings both joy and sadness to an executioner, for it is simultaneously an act of justice and charity.

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Teaching *phronesis*: new developments

This presentation comprises three parts. The *first* part rehearses and fleshes out some preliminary observations about what *phronesis* (practical wisdom) is, mainly based on Aristotle, and explains why and how *phronesis* has been strangely neglected in most of the recent character education literature, although most of it claims to draw upon Aristotle. The *second* part charts some recent developments in the study of *phronesis* and wisdom more generally in psychology, and how those have begun to impact on the teaching of *phronesis*, both at the secondary-school and university levels. The *third* part explores the much under-researched concept of collective *phronesis* from Aristotle's *Politics*, and its potential relevance both for the teaching of civic virtues and of organisational/managerial wisdom.

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Virtue and technology.
Three models of analysis

It is only recently that virtue ethics theorists have recognized the importance of technology on human flourishing. In most cases, however, their analyses are interventional and fail to provide a detailed account on the relation between the character traits of an agent and the role played by its technologically augmented environment. Moreover, the research focuses on the ways of adaptation of a generally virtuous agent to the technological environment rather than on the transformations of virtuousness forced by the mediation of agency through technology. My presentation consists of two parts. First, I point out three possible models of virtue ethical analysis of technology-influenced virtuousness: the technomoral model developed by Susan Vallor, the phronesis-based model of pretechnological virtuousness, and a possible model based on adaptation of the 4E model of cognition and Material Engagement Theory to ethics. In the second part of the presentation, I outline this extended virtue thesis, focusing on the role played by the agent's environment in expressing and developing their capacities of moral acting. Drawing on Sherry Turkle's concept of 'evocative objects', I highlight the active role of some digital and technological items in organizing the dispositions of an agent and the way in which they can contribute to the formation of a virtuous human-technological coupling.

PAGE | 21

The University
of Gdańsk

Virtue & Human
Development
GDAŃSK, 2–3 JUNE 2022

The Institute
of Philosophy

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Virtues clusters and patient's virtues: An instance of virtue molecularism

Virtue theories have been ranging from strict unitarianism to wide particularism, or even situationism. Within this complex galaxy, we suggest a prototypical approach, identifying practical wisdom as the core – prototypical – virtue and all the virtues as derived declinations of it related to contexts, situations, personalities, and conditions. In doing so, we fundamentally endorse a *molecular* position, after De Caro and Vaccarezza (2020), which assigns to the "good person" a certain amount of "virtuosity" (namely, of practical wisdom), while admitting the existence of varied combinations of particular virtues for different moral agents. Admittedly, not only the virtues are always connected to (or elicited by) phronesis, but they are placed in groups of higher or lower density, according to the strengths of their interactions. In other words, we suggest that the virtues come as clusters, each of them gathering virtuous traits which call one another in specific ways, both on a general level and – more importantly – on particular ones (Navarini, 2022) . This does not overlap with Curzer's (1993) view, according to which these virtues, as opposed to general ones, help people to reach specific goals, for example in their professional life, but

PAGE | **22**

**The University
of Gdańsk**

Virtue & Human
Development
Gdańsk, 2–3 June 2022

The Institute
of Philosophy

might be in conflict with those serving other roles, for example as parents or artists and so on. Role virtues, in his account, may change significantly in various contexts within one's life, whereas in our proposal, we rather maintain the existence of a strong link between some virtues, which seem to cooperate in a special way to develop a good life throughout different contexts and conditions. Undoubtedly, however, some extra-ordinary conditions require new depth in our moral development, new ways of dealing with our virtuous skills, and the urgent reinforcement of related virtues clusters. The example of suffering is probably one of the most representative in this respect, since suffering can be identified as a transformative experience (Paul, 2014) *par excellence*. Within illness, for example, our narrative identity is forced to adapt to this new existential condition which, in turn, calls for a revised way of moral expertise and of moral growth, grounded in the patient's acquisition of appropriate virtuous traits, and favored by the professional's acquisition of a specific *caring manner* (Ricci, 2022).

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Human flourishing: between epistemic and ethical reasonableness

What we pursue as individuals in our lives is strictly connected and dependent upon decisions at the political government. The 'thesis of continuity' gives us the correct outlook on the relationship between ethics and politics. However, we confront radically different conceptions of the human good: from subjectivist conceptions of wellbeing to objective list theories. We can identify the most suitable view only if we understand the central place of the environmental crisis in our age and its consequences for the theory of the good. My proposal is that of arguing for a 'developmental' (perfectionist) conception of human flourishing within which the idea of 'ethical reasonableness' is central. This idea hinges on Von Wright's understanding of reasonableness as 'the right way of living' for man, that I translate in terms of the way of the virtues among which reasonableness takes the legacy of phronesis. This conception can induce us to make the correct choices with regard to the environment but only if it is supplemented by a view of 'epistemic reasonableness': beliefs that it is reasonable to have. In turn, in my view epistemic reasonableness can show some degree of objectivity if grounded in procedures such as abduction, analogy and argumentation and strengthened on the subjective side of virtue epistemology.

PAGE | 24

The University
of Gdańsk

Virtue & Human
Development
Gdańsk, 2–3 June 2022

The Institute
of Philosophy

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Baselines for human nature, human development and human morality

In order to make appropriate recommendations for fostering moral development and designing moral education, we need to establish appropriate baselines. First we need to understand the nature that humans evolved. From a transdisciplinary integrative perspective that includes ethnography, genetic evolution, evolutionary systems theory, and multiple human sciences, we conclude that humans evolved to be highly cooperative, egalitarian and receptively intelligent, and sensitive to a sentient earth. Second, we have the evidence to show how such a nature is nurtured, through our species' evolved nest, which meets our many basic needs, leading to individual and community thriving. We know what that thriving looks like based on observations of communities that provide the evolved nest. Our evolved nest shapes our cooperative human nature and maintains it throughout life. Our thriving, cooperative human nature includes multiple intelligences, especially situated in right hemisphere functioning, inclusive of compassionate morality. However, instead of following our species wellness-promoting pathway, the dominant culture follows a trauma-inducing pathway. Early life trauma and undercare (lack of nestedness) undermines the development of human nature and instead forces a reliance on pre-human nature. Illbeing is established at the neurobiological and biochemical level, which affects functioning "all the way

PAGE | 25

The University
of Gdańsk

Virtue & Human
Development
Gdańsk, 2–3 June 2022

The Institute
of Philosophy

up" to moral functioning. The trauma-inducing pathway has led to the ecological and human crises that are proliferating which have our species, and many others, on the brink of extinction. Only a restoration of our wellness-promoting pathway and a kinship worldview will return us to being responsible and respectful members of the earth community.

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Resocialization and human development

The social rehabilitation or resocialization refers to the specific kind of moral education, dedicated to individuals convicted criminal and imprisoned.

The essence of resocialization is the process of discarding former moral attitudes and accepting new ones as part of a transition/transgression in one's life. In fact, these individuals have experienced across the life course some moral worlds, mainly the moral world of criminal subculture and the moral world of the penitentiary system. The result of resocialization is presenting itself metaphorically as a palimpsest - a document in which writing has been covered or replaced by new writing.

The effective process of resocialization includes (at least) two key moments: a making a decision about the change, most commonly undertaken in a psychological crisis situation, and the professional support of an educator/therapist.

How should human development be understood in this case? What means "perfecting moral character", "developing ethical virtues" and "achieving eudaimonia" in the context of resocialization?

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The growth of human power, consequentialism and ethics of virtue

In my presentation, I analyze the views of selected contemporary philosophers (H. Jonas, P. Singer, W. MacAskill, T. Ord), who notice the unprecedented growth of the power of an individual and, based on it, propose to reform ethics towards consequentialism. As part of this reform, they postulate radical changes in the understanding of moral obligations and in the moral practice: e.g. expanding the circle of moral care and recognizing that human responsibility extends to the whole humanity, its survival and development. Consequentialist ethics is presented as an adequate tool to deal with the moral difficulties associated with the increase in human power, and application of this ethics is supposed to lead to moral progress, survival and flourishing of humanity. In the presentation, I present the arguments founded on the growth of the power of an individual, which support the postulate to think about our moral obligations within the framework of consequentialism. Then, based on the same arguments, I present the reasoning that justifies the thesis that the growth of the power of an individual and the opportunities and threats for the survival and development of humanity, seem to constitute the basis for a consequentialist argumentation for the promotion of the development of virtues rather than making the attempts of impartial calculation more popular. There seem to be good consequentialist reasons for promoting a virtue ethics more than any other approach in ethics

(including consequentialism). Virtue ethics is known as a way of human development but it may also be a way to safeguard development of humanity.

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About an intimate relationship between virtue and free decisions

Imagine three simultaneous worlds, each containing at some point, a person, John who is indistinguishable in terms of virtue from his counterparts in the other two worlds. John$_a$, John$_b$, John$_c$, although at some point are indistinguishable, each has a different history that leads to this point. John$_a$ became virtuous through a series of decisions and training; John$_b$ was a subject of a secret program introduced by his government that consisted of manipulation on brain with a use of sophisticated nano-technology; John$_c$ has undergone the same procedure as John$_b$ except the author of the change in his brain was not his government but his parents. Does the fact that these undistinguishable men have different histories make any difference to our moral estimation of their virtue? Can we still speak of virtue in all three cases? What else does this case help us discover about what think of virtue? These are the questions I would like to focus on during my presentation.

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Selecting virtuous judges

Every society needs good law for its development, and even more so – excellent judges. What is judicial excellence, and how do we identify the best candidates for judicial offices? On the face of it, most societies and politicians agree that judges should be appointed based on merit and qualities of their character. Nonetheless, in times of partisan politics, the very possibility of judicial impartiality becomes disputed. As a result, the selection of candidates for the highest judicial offices tends to be determined by their ability to answer "correctly" to politically and ideologically sensitive problems. In this view, merit or character as qualities may become misunderstood for the ability to contribute to the partisan cause. The law typically recognizes and demands that in addition to formal education and legal knowledge, the excellence of judicial candidates hinges on their impeccable character. The meaning of this criterion is not self-evident, and the selection procedures often fall short of giving it its full due. I will argue that the idea of judicial excellence is best understood in terms of virtues, seen as acquired and reliable dispositions to act in a morally righteous way. Judicial virtues are the virtues that judges possess in connection with their role in the lives of other people to whom the court serves justice. After considering how this concept may help us recognize a judge's best character qualities, I will discuss how we may identify and select the candidates for judicial offices who possess the relevant traits. In the attempt to answer this practi-

cal problem, I point to the process of development of virtue and the concept of moral education. The claim is that in addition to procedures of screening for virtues and vices, moral education and virtue development shed light on how to improve the judicial selection process.

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Business and virtues.
On the application of the ethics of virtues
by A. MacIntyre in contemporary business.

In my presentation, I will present the most important assumptions of virtue ethics concerning contemporary business problems. Using Alasdair MacIntyre's and Geoff Moore's thesis I will try to answer the questions of what the terms "good" organization, "good" manager and "good" person mean; how individuals affect organizations and how organizations affect people. Are we the same person at work and home? The central notions will be human life as a kind of narrative (in particular concerning the notion of goal (telos) and virtues - i.e. qualities of character - that should characterize a manager in order for him or her to be recognized as a virtuous manager.

The virtues ethics approach is very different from classic CSR and the stakeholder approach. It does not offer a utilitarian, calculating approach to ethics, although it would not eschew entirely calculations of some kind as one possible contributory factor in making decisions. The concern for the contribution which the organization makes to the common good takes us back much more closely to the macro-social concerns which were a feature of early CSR than the organizationally focused concerns of strategic CSR. The approach argued for here does not conceive of ethics-as--strategy, but applying this approach to organizational ethics may have strategic implications. The starting point of this approach is the "purpose" of the organization.

MacIntyrean virtue ethics offers an integrated framework in which we can find implications for individuals as individuals, and how one might approach life as a whole, including one's working life in organizations. There are also implications for individuals as managers, but these are integrated with the implications for the individual as individual. And in addition, there are implications for organizations, and indeed for society as a whole.

Notes

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Virtue & Human Development